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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark Whitman appeals from the judgment of conviction following his conditional 
guilty pleas after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. Mr. Whitman 
asserts that the district court erred when it denied h1s motion to suppress evidence 
found during a warrantless search of his vehicle because the State failed to establish an 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At between 6:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. on December 27, 2008, Idaho State Trooper 
Bailey observed a Suburban leave a gas station pulling a trailer that did not have a 
license plate and did not have its tail lights activated. He initiated a traffic stop and 
identified Mr. Whitman as the driver. Trooper Bailey believed that he had seen another 
person driving the vehicle in the gas station parking lot, so he asked Mr. Whitman if 
there was anyone else in the vehicle. Mr. Whitman, who paused before answering, 
"said he was the only person inside the vehicle." Trooper Bailey then noticed a bullet in 
the middle console, and asked if there were any firearms inside the vehicle, to which 
Mr. Whitman replied "no there was not." (Supp.Tr., 1 p.18, L.15 p.23, L.5.) 
Suspicious about both of Mr. Whitman's responses, Trooper Bailey then scanned 
the interior of the vehicle, at which point he noticed "some brown hair sticking out of a 
1 Three volumes of transcripts were prepared on appeal. One transcript volume, 
covering the suppression hearing, was prepared as a supplemental transcript. For ease 
of reference, appellate counsel will cite to it as "Supp.Tr." Another transcript volume 
includes a hearing on a motion to reset the motion to suppress hearing and the 
sentencing hearing. For ease of reference, appellate counsel will cite to it as "Sent.Tr." 
The third transcript volume contains the hearing on Mr. Whitman's conditional guilty 
plea. For ease of reference, appellate counsel will cite to it as "Plea.Tr." 
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blanket in the rear compartment of the [S]uburban." At that point, Trooper Bailey "gave 
loud clear commands for the individual to show his hands and present himself to me." 
The man, identified as Michael Maddox, was asked to sit in the front passenger seat 
while Trooper Bailey ran checks on both Mr. Whitman and Mr. Maddox. The check 
revealed that Mr. Maddox had multiple warrants, and he was taken into custody at 
gunpoint with the assistance of the Elmore County Sheriff's Department. Mr. Whitman 
was then removed from the car, patted down for weapons, and detained. (Supp.Tr., 
p.23, L.6 - p.29, L.1.) 
Trooper Bailey, assisted by Deputy Sterling, searched the Suburban. During the 
search, they discovered a brown briefcase containing a loaded handgun, a plastic bag 
with a white crystal residue, and a scale. Under the rear seats, they discovered two 
other handguns, one of which was loaded. Finally, in a black leather jacket in the rear 
compartment, they discovered a glass pipe. (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.18 - p.33, L.8.) 
As a result of the traffic stop and the items found within the vehicle, Mr. Whitman 
was charged with aiding and abetting grand theft by receiving or possessing stolen 
property (one of the handguns), possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), resisting or obstructing officers (for lying about being alone in the 
vehicle), and possession of paraphernalia (for a butane torch and the scale). 
(R., pp.17-19.) 
Defense counsel then filed a motion to suppress, in which he asserted that the 
recently-issued case of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), 
prohibited the type of search conducted by the police in his case. 2 (R., pp.24-26.) 
2 Although defense counsel mentioned the Idaho Constitution in the motion, he did not 
quote Article I, § 17, or assert why or how that provision provides greater protection 
2 
Neither the parties nor the district court had the guidance of the Supreme Court's later 
decision in Davis v. United States,_ U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), in which the 
Court declined to exclude evidence found in violation of Gant to a search conducted 
before it was issued when such a search was "conducted in reasonable reliance on 
binding precedent[.]" Davis at 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29. 
In opposing Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress, the State argued, inter alia, that 
the search of the vehicle was "justified as a protective Terry3 frisk of the vehicle[,]" and 
that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. (R., pp.38-48; 64-66.) 
Ultimately, the district court denied Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress based on Ganfs 
exception for purposes of finding evidence relevant to the offense of arrest and under 
the doctrine of inevitable discovery. (R., pp.102-05.) 
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Whitman and the State 
agreed that he could enter a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled 
substance and resisting or obstructing officers, reserving his right to appeal the district 
court's ruling on his motion to suppress. (R., pp.111-14.) Pursuant to the agreement, 
Mr. Whitman pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and resisting or 
obstructing officers, and the remaining counts (one and four) were dismissed. (Plea.Tr., 
p.14, L.22-p.19, L.25; Sent.Tr., p.19, Ls.7-8.) 
Mr. Whitman was sentenced to seven years, with three years fixed, on the 
possession of a controlled substance charge, and a sentence of one year on the 
resisting or obstructing an officer charge. The district court suspended execution of 
both sentences, and placed Mr. Whitman on probation for a period of four years. 
than the Fourth Amendment. As such, no appeal can be taken on this basis. See 
State v. Kofoed, 147 Idaho 296 (2009) and State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404 (1992). 
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
3 
(Sent.Tr., p.18, L.5- p.19, L.12.) Mr. Whitman flied a Notice of Appeal timely from the 
judgment of conviction. (R., p.134.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress 
evidence found during a warrantless search of his vehicle? 
2. Is the United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Davis v. United States 
fatal to Mr. Whitman's Gant argument? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Whitman's Motion To Suppress Evidence 
Found During A Search Of His Vehicle 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Whitman asserts that the district court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence found during the warrantless search of his vehicle was erroneous. 
Specifically, the district court erred when it held that an exception to the Gant rule 
applied and that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. Both holdings 
are unsupported by the record and the law. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Whitman's Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Found During A Search Of His Vehicle 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. The burden of proof 
rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,290 (1995). 
1. The District Court Erred When It Found That An Exception To The Gant 
Rule Applied 
In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct 1710 (2009), the United States 
Supreme Court clarified its case law, specifically, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
6 
(1981 ), with respect to vehicle searches following the arrest of an occupant, ultimately 
holding that police may "search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only 
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search." Gant at_, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. The Court also 
announced an exception to this rule, specifically, "that circumstances unique to the 
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable to 
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."' Id. 
(quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part)). Finally, as relevant here, the Court announced another exception when "there is 
probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Id. at _, 
129 S. Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)). 
The district court rejected any argument that either Mr. Whitman or his passenger 
was within reaching distance of the vehicle when it was searched. (R., p.102.) 
However, in denying Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress, the district court held that the 
search was lawful under the exception for probable cause that evidence of a crime is in 
the vehicle, specifically holding, 
Trooper Bailey observed objective and articulable evidence that the 
Defendant had a concealed weapon in the vehicle. The Defendant had 
already lied when questioned about whether an additional occupant was in 
the vehicle. Given the presence of the ammunition, the Defendant's 
inclinations [sic] to make false representations, and the outstanding 
warrant and accompanying warning that the passenger might be a risk 
when apprehended, the officer had probable cause to believe that a 
concealed weapon was in all likelihood located in the vehicle. 
(R., pp.102-03.) 
The district court cited to Idaho Code § 18-3302, what it classified as "the 
concealed weapons probation" (R., p.105), in holding the police had probable cause to 
believe that the crime of possessing a concealed weapon had been committed and that 
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evidence of that crime would "in all likelihood" be found in the vehicle. (R., pp.102-03.) 
In fact, under Idaho law it is not unlawful to carry a concealed weapon within a vehicle 
unless one is within the limits of a city. See I.C. § 18-3302(9) ("While in any motor 
vehicle, inside the limits or confines of any city, a person shall not carry a concealed 
weapon on or about his person without a license to carry a concealed weapon."). 
Furthermore, the State, which had the burden of proof of establishing an exception to 
the warrant requirement, presented no testimony as to whether the traffic stop in this 
case occurred within the limits of any city. (Supp.Tr., p.3, Ls.5-15; p.18, L.15 - p.21, 
LB.) 
Second, assuming, arguendo, that it was a crime to carry a concealed weapon in 
a vehicle under the facts of this case, the district court cited to no case law to support its 
finding that the presence of a bullet in plain view provided probable cause to believe 
that a concealed weapon was in the vehicle. (R., pp.102-03.) An appellate court in at 
least one other jurisdiction has held otherwise. See People v. Colyar, 941 N.E.2d 479 
(Ill. App. Ct 2010), rev. allowed, 949 N.E.2d 1100 (2011) (police officer's observation of 
bullet in plain view in center console of passenger compartment of vehicle did not 
provide probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed). 
Finally, in making its findings, the district court implied that the exception for a 
search incident to arrest might also apply. (R., p.102.) With respect to the search 
incident to arrest exception, the evidence is clear that Mr. Whitman was not under arrest 
at the time of the search, and that Trooper Bailey had not decided whether he was 
going to cite or arrest Mr. Whitman for anything. (Supp. Tr., p.29, L.20 - p.30, L.1 0 
(Trooper Bailey so testifying).) Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that 
Mr. Whitman had been under arrest for resisting or obstructing an officer at the time of 
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the search, there was no indication that the police were searching for evidence related 
to that crime when they conducted the search. 
2. The District Court Erred When It Found That The Evidence Would 
Inevitably Have Been Discovered 
Under the inevitable discovery exception to the warrant requirement, evidence 
found during an illegal search need not be suppressed if the State can establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that it would inevitably have been discovered through 
lawful means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). As the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has noted, 
The inevitable discovery doctrine was not intended to allow a court to 
consider what actions the authorities should or could have taken and in 
doing so then determine that lawful discovery of already unlawfully 
obtained evidence would have been inevitable. 
[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine was never intended to swallow the 
exclusionary rule by substituting what the police should have done for 
what they really did. 
State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 916-17 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). 
In support of its argument that the inevitable discovery exception applied to the 
evidence discovered in Mr. Whitman's vehicle, the State argued that "the evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered when the Defendant was arrested and the 
trooper conducted an inventory search of the vehicle he was driving pursuant to written 
Idaho State Police policy." (R., p.66.) 
In upholding the legality of the warrantless search on alternative grounds, the 
district court accepted the State's argument that the evidence would inevitably have 
been discovered, specifically holding that: 
9 
Officers had ample probable cause to suspect he [Mr. Whitman] had 
committed crimes, and the officers had justification to take the Defendant 
and his vehicle into custody. A subsequent search of the vehicle, 
pursuant to the inventory procedures, would have yielded the same 
evidence which the Defendant now seeks to suppress. Thus, the doctrine 
of inevitable discovery applies in this instance, allowing the State to use 
the evidence obtained in the warrantless vehicle search. 
(R., p.105.) 
The only crime for which the police might have had probable cause to arrest 
Mr. Whitman prior to the search of his vehicle was resisting or obstructing an officer. 
However, Mr. Whitman's actions in arguably lying to the police about whether there was 
a passenger in his vehicle did not provide probable cause that he had violated Idaho 
Code § 18-705. See State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885 (Ct. App. 1995) (where a 
defendant makes a false response to a law enforcement officer's question that he was 
not legally obligated to answer and such a "deliberate falsification was no more 
obstructive than would have been his silence[,]" there could be no violation of I.C. § 18-
705). Additionally, Trooper Bailey clearly and unequivocally testified that he had not 
decided whether he was going to cite Mr. Whitman (presumably for the purported traffic 
infractions) or arrest him (presumably for obstructing or resisting) at the time that he 
conducted the search of Mr. Whitman's vehicle.4 (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.20 - p.30, L.10.) 
Given the facts of this case, and the limits of the inevitable discovery exception 
set forth in Bunting, it cannot be said that the State showed, by a preponderance of the 
4 In its order denying the motion to suppress, the district court noted, "The Defendant 
also does not dispute whether Trooper Bailey had probable cause to take the Defendant 
into custody prior to the search." (R., p.99.) To the extent that the district court's finding 
implies that Mr. Whitman did not challenge the legality of his arrest, it is incorrect. 
(R., p.78 (challenging the sufficiency of evidence that Mr. Whitman had committed a 
crime prior to the warrantless search of his vehicle).) 
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evidence, that the evidence found during the warrantless search of his vehicle would 
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means. 
11. 
The United States Supreme Court's Recent Holding In Davis v. United States Is Not 
Fatal To Mr. Whitman's Gant Argument 
In Davis v. United States, U.S. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), 5 the United 
States Supreme Court clarified the scope and effect of its decision in Gant. Specifically, 
the Court held that the Gant rule does not apply to exclude evidence found in searches 
that occurred prior to the issuance of its opinion when the police acted "in reasonable 
reliance on binding precedent[.]" Id. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29. While this decision 
might appear to be fatal to Mr. Whitman's Gant argument, he submits that it is not. 
Unlike the facts in Davis, in which "all agree[d] that the officers' conduct was in 
strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way[,]" Davis 
at , 131 S. Ct. at 2428, no such agreement is present here. In this case, the trooper 
never explicitly testified as to the legal justification for his search, let alone cite to Belton 
or its progeny as the basis for his search. (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.15 p.31, L.4.) For this 
reason, Davis can be distinguished from the facts of this case. 
In the alternative, if this Court finds that the record below was not fully developed 
on this issue because Davis was not issued until after this case was appealed, this 
Court should remand for further proceedings in light of Davis. 
5 The Davis opinion was not released until after Mr. Whitman's case was appealed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Whitman respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate his conviction and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of November, 
12 
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